ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION:
BALANCING FREE DISCOVERY
WITH LIMITS ON ABUSE
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ABSTRACT
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) have long
sought to limit abuses that developed under the traditional
presumption favoring free discovery. The 2006 amendments to the
Rules are specifically aimed at curbing abuses associated with
electronically stored information (ESI), which has become the
basic medium of business communications and has provided
businesses with overall productivity benefits.
The 2006
amendments introduce a new category of electronic evidence that is
“not reasonably accessible” and allow a court to shift the related
costs of discovery to the party requesting the information. Costshifting, however, creates an incentive for businesses to shelter
sensitive data by making it “not reasonably accessible.” This
iBrief argues that the current tests created by the courts for costshifting should be reassessed and should include a benefit-shifting
component that offsets business savings from using ESI as a
storage medium. Rather than treating ESI as exceptional, the
Rules should adopt a uniform approach that curbs abuses of all
discovery.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
As businesses have begun to keep most records as electronically
stored information (ESI), scholars and practitioners have debated how
liberal electronic discovery (e-discovery) standards should be. 2
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) have
sought to reduce the “uncertainty, expense, delays and burdens” created by
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discovering volumes of electronic data. 3 Reformers amended the discovery
Rules in 1983, 1993, and 2000 to limit abuses that developed under the
traditional presumption favoring free discovery. 4 In 2006, further
amendments focused on e-discovery and introduced a new but undefined
category of electronic evidence that is “not reasonably accessible.” 5 The
amended Rule 26 requires the requesting party to make certain showings
before being granted discovery. 6 Even then, a court may shift the costs of
discovery, compelling the party requesting the documents to pay some or all
of the costs of production. Cost-shifting existed before 2006 as a matter of
judicial discretion, but the commentary to the amended Rules expressly
incorporates the term for the first time, which may encourage using costshifting to limit e-discovery inappropriately.
¶2
This iBrief argues that ESI, which has become the basic medium of
business communications, should not be subject to media-specific discovery
limitations. Businesses make storage decisions taking many factors into
consideration, including the prospect of litigation. To bias that decision by
limiting discovery for a particular medium because it is less accessible
would invite sheltering of sensitive data. As a result, companies may
purposely store potentially adverse data in a way that limits its discovery.

This iBrief further argues that the multifactor tests for cost-shifting
encouraged by the 2006 amendments and previously formulated in cases
including Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc. 7 and
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake I) 8 should be reassessed in
light of current information management technology. This iBrief
recommends that courts should interpret the “reasonably accessible”
provision broadly and presume most ESI reasonably accessible, even if kept
for backup purposes. Courts should rarely permit exceptions to the rule that
custodians bear production costs, and any cost-shifting should include a
benefit-shifting component that offsets business savings from using ESI as
the storage medium. Rather than treating e-discovery as exceptional, the
Rules should address abusive discovery as a separate issue.
¶3

3

COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 23 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf.
4
See infra Part II.A.
5
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Id. 26(b)(2)(C).
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I. BENEFITS OF ESI
¶4
Commentators have warned that making ESI freely discoverable
would be too costly and inconvenient. 9 Businesses increasingly use ESI,
however, reflecting its overall advantages despite these discovery-related
concerns.

ESI’s prevalence 10 reflects the transition to computers for
processing business information to realize productivity benefits. 11
Businesses benefit from digitizing information—converting it into a form
computers recognize 12 —in many ways, ranging from better communication
with customers to more efficient storage. 13 In addition, all businesses are
subject to requirements to retain proper records, 14 and storing that
information electronically is less costly. 15 In short, digitizing intellectual
property improves efficiency and reduces costs for businesses. 16
¶5

9

See Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery
Rules, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 67–68 (2007) (“[E-]discovery is more timeconsuming, more burdensome, and more costly than conventional discovery.”);
Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J.
561, 592 (2001) (“[E]lectronic discovery can be predicted, as a general matter,
to give rise to burdens and expense that are of a completely different magnitude
from those encountered in traditional discovery.”).
10
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
11
See, e.g., Eric Brynjolfsson & Lorin M. Hitt, Computing Productivity: FirmLevel Evidence 26–27 (MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4210-01, 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=290325 (stating that computers provide a
substantial long-term contribution to productivity growth); Bernanke Discusses
Productivity, Not Inflation, in Commencement Address, USA TODAY, June 9,
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/fed/2006-06-09-bernankemit_x.htm (“America’s strong productivity performance has been bolstered . . .
by the greater use of computers . . . .”).
12
See Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal
Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 333–34 (2000)
(explaining how computers store information in binary form).
13
See Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 462 (D. Utah 1985) (mem.)
(“From the largest corporations to the smallest families, people are using
computers to cut costs, improve production, enhance communication, store
countless data and improve capabilities . . . .”).
14
See In re Prudential Inc. of Am. Sales Litig., 169 F.R.D. 598, 617 (D.N.J.
1997) (criticizing the absence of a comprehensive document-retention policy
that “impede[s] the litigation process and merit[s] imposition of sanctions”).
15
See Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (mem.) (“With electronic media . . . costs of storage are
virtually nil.”).
16
Barrie Locke, Case Study: Sony’s Digital Realm, AIIM E-DOC MAG.,
May/June 2007, at 55, available at http://www.aiimdigital.org/aiim/20070506/?pg=57 (“Sony Pictures Entertainment has amassed
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Businesses deciding how to store information consider more than
the cost benefits from digital storage. They also value technology that
enables searching, organizing, and retrieving ESI, which makes daily
business operations easier. 17 The prospect of litigation imposes similar
demands to make information accessible in an organized, orderly manner. 18
Although responding to discovery involves substantial costs, businesses
derive independent benefits from storing and organizing records
electronically. In sum, the benefits businesses enjoy from ESI justify
investing substantial capital in such technology. 19
¶6

II. ESI AND COST-SHIFTING UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
¶7
Historically, federal courts have permitted broad discovery under
the Rules, recognizing that “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation.” 20 Parties
responding to discovery requests had to bear the expense of complying with
those requests, subject only to an exception for discovery imposing “undue
burden or expense” on responding parties, 21 an exception courts applied

an enormous digital library . . . as a creative repository for its worldwide
marketing teams across business units . . . to share media assets and accelerate
the servicing, distribution, approval, and print workflows associated with
entertainment marketing.”).
17
See Bryant Duhon, Managing Documents and Email at the National
Geographic Society, AIIM E-DOC MAG., March/April 2007, at 52, available at
http://www.aiim-digital.org/aiim/20070304/?pg=54 (“[I]f we can’t find an email
because it’s lost in this morass of 10GB email boxes, then we may lose some
negotiated right to intellectual property or we may have to repeatedly repay to
use a photo that we actually have the right to use. Keeping the right email is
extremely important to us.”).
18
See Wagner v. Dryvit Sys., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 606, 610 (D. Neb. 2001) (mem.)
(“[P]roducing large amount of documents in no apparent order does not comply
with a party’s obligation under Rule 34.”); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home
Indem. Co., No. 88-9752, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8304, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. June
17, 1991) (mem.) (finding that the peculiar manner in which a party maintained
records and its computer system did not excuse it from burdensome and costly
production).
19
See Steve Lohr, The Economy Transformed, Bit by Bit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
1999, http://partners.nytimes.com/library/financial/122099outlook-econ.html
(reporting that businesses invest $380 billion per year in computers, up from
$110 billion five years previously, and that this figure probably will continue to
increase).
20
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
21
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); accord Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.
340, 358 (1978).
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narrowly. 22 This combination of allowing one party to enjoy liberal
discovery while having the other party pay the related costs invited abuse,
and various amendments to the Rules were enacted from 1983 through 2000
to discourage overuse of discovery. 23
¶8
As ESI became more widespread, lawmakers labored to incorporate
ESI into a legal system that was established when record keeping was
verbal or written. 24 In 2006, the Rules were amended to reduce
inconsistency and to develop a national set of rules for ESI in federal
courts. 25 The drafters fit ESI into the existing system, resisting requests to
impose additional mandatory limitations on ESI.

Nevertheless, the 2006 amendments had one potentially restrictive
effect on e-discovery: for the first time, the Rules explicitly imposed
limitations, including making cost-shifting available, for discovery of ESI
that is “not reasonably accessible.” 26 If courts widely impose cost-shifting,
it may change the practice of liberal discovery just as effectively as any
mandatory limitations.
¶9

A. The 1983–2000 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
In 1983, language was added to Rule 26(b)(2)(C) that
commentators have characterized as a “radical departure from the free and
easy days of liberal discovery.” 27 The added language, known as the
proportionality test, directs that discovery “shall be limited” if certain
conditions exist, including if discovery is “unduly burdensome or
expensive.” 28 The limitation was intended to prevent significant abuse,
such as the use of discovery “as a device to coerce a party.” 29
¶10

¶11
In 1993 and 2000, the Committee on the Rules of Practice and
Procedure made additional, similarly motivated amendments to procedural
rules governing discovery. These amendments included mandatory
conferences to develop a plan for disclosure and the separation of

22

See, e.g., Adelman v. Nordberg Mfg. Co., 6 F.R.D. 383, 384 (E.D. Wis. 1947)
(“It is not a valid objection that the [discovery request] will necessitate large
expenditures of time and money by defendant if in other respects the
information sought is a proper object of discovery.”).
23
See infra Part II.A.
24
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-201 (2004) (stating that a contract for the sale of goods
for $5,000 or more must be in writing).
25
See infra Part II.B.
26
See infra Part II.B.
27
Noyes, supra note 9, at 56.
28
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
29
Id. 26(b) advisory committee’s note.
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discoverable material into two classes: one that is freely discoverable if it
“is relevant to the claim or defense of any party” and another that meets a
lesser standard of relevance “to the subject matter involved in the action”
and is discoverable only upon a showing of “good cause.” 30

B. The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
¶12
Parties could discover ESI even before the 2006 amendments to the
Rules, and perhaps no amendment was needed to make this explicit. 31 The
2006 amendments, however, create a new category 32 of discoverable data
that is “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.” 33
Although the drafters of the 2006 amendments contemplated that the parties
would agree on what data are within this third category before discovery
begins, 34 the amended Rules provide that, on a motion to compel discovery,
a custodian resisting discovery must show that the requested discovery is
“not reasonably accessible.” 35 If the proposed discovery meets the “not
reasonably accessible” standard, the requesting party then must show good
cause, “considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C),” for the court to
compel the resisting party to produce the ESI. The court also may impose
conditions, 36 including cost-shifting, on the e-discovery. 37
¶13
The Rule 26(b)(2)(C) limitation referenced in the new rule is the
same proportionality test that the 1983 amendments impose on all discovery
requests. 38 Judges have never applied that test to meaningfully limit
discovery, 39 and so it is unlikely judges will apply it more expansively for
e-discovery. Thus, commentators have observed that, if the purpose of the
2006 amendments was to provide “additional protection against the cost and
burden of discovery beyond that already available,” 40 the addition of the
good cause standard is “so vague that it is meaningless.” 41

Despite adding no new substantive bar to discovery of ESI, the
2006 amendments provide two important advantages to parties resisting e¶14

30

Noyes, supra note 9, at 57–61.
See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc., No. 94CIV.2120 (LMM) (AJP),
1995 WL 649934, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 1995) (“[I]t is black letter law that
computerized data is discoverable if relevant.”).
32
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
33
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
34
Id. 34(b) advisory committee’s note.
35
Id. 26(b)(2)(B).
36
Id.
37
Id. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note.
38
See supra text accompanying note 28.
39
Noyes, supra note 9, at 56–57.
40
Id. at 73.
41
Id. at 52.
31
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discovery. First, they permanently embedded the idea that some ESI is “not
reasonably accessible” in the Rules, even though the technology that
originally made ESI seem inaccessible is rapidly changing. Second, they
suggest that courts may impose conditions, including cost-shifting, 42 on
discovery of ESI even after a party shows good cause to compel
discovery. 43
¶15
By introducing the term “not reasonably accessible” the 2006
amendments invite courts to revisit traditional doctrines of liberal discovery.
Courts have applied various approaches to determine the scope of
discovery, which the next Part discusses.

III. CASE TRENDS IN COST-SHIFTING
The 2006 amendments made only modest changes to prior practice
under Rule 26, so prior cases regarding cost-shifting remain relevant in
predicting the Rule’s future application. At the risk of oversimplifying, one
possible way to group courts’ various approaches is to divide them into
three groups.
¶16

¶17
First, some courts apply a bright-line rule that focuses on one or a
few determinative factors. The most common determining factor is which
party chose the storage medium causing the production costs. Second,
some cases take an economics-based approach, which quantifies likely costs
and benefits of production and then shifts costs according to the marginal
utility of the document request. Third, some cases apply a formula-based
approach, sorting the particular facts of the case into a predetermined grid
of multiple issues relevant to cost-shifting, often including those issues
considered in the first two approaches.

A. Bright Line Rule: Business Bound by Its Choice of Medium
¶18
Applying a bright-line rule implies a simplistic determination based
on one or a few issues, leaving no room for discretion in complex cases.
Courts have cited In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust
Litigation 44 as creating a simplistic rule that courts cannot shift costs when

42

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s note (suggesting that such
conditions could include requiring a requesting party to pay part or all of the
related costs). Previously, cost-shifting was based in courts’ implicit
discretionary authority under Rule 26(c) to issue protective orders limiting
discovery that creates “undue burden or expense.” Id.
43
Id. 26(b)(2)(B).
44
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL
997, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1995) (mem.).
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the costs result from a backup system a custodian of ESI has chosen. 45 In
this case, however, the court considered many factors before focusing on a
few when deciding not to shift costs. 46 In re Brand Name cited a series of
cases that reached similar results. 47 Rather than using a bright-line rule,
these courts also considered multiple factors, including which party chose
the backup system. 48
¶19
In re Brand Name was a consolidation of various antitrust actions
by retail pharmacies against manufacturers and wholesalers of prescription
drugs. 49 During discovery, the plaintiffs asked the defendants to search and
retrieve e-mails, some of which were indisputably relevant, from backup
tapes. 50 Four of the defendants complied without seeking cost-shifting. 51
One did not, estimating a cost of $50,000 to $70,000 and arguing that the
plaintiff should bear this cost. 52

45

Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (mem.).
46
Id.
47
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *2.
48
E.g., Delozier v. First Nat’l Bank of Gatlinburg, 109 F.R.D. 161, 164 (1986)
(mem.); Kozlowski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 73 F.R.D. 73, 75–76 (1976). For
example, in Kozlowski, the minor plaintiff sustained severe burns when his
pajamas ignited. Id. at 74. The plaintiff requested that the defendant, who
manufactured and marketed the pajamas, produce “a record of all complaints
and communications concerning personal injuries or death caused by the
burning of children’s nightwear.” Id. The defendant objected and failed to
comply with the request. Id. at 75. The court considered the relevance of the
requested information, the plaintiff’s need for the documents, the defendant’s
possession of them, and the plaintiff’s lack of alternate access to them. Id. at 75–
76. The court then concluded that “[t]he defendant may not excuse itself from
compliance . . . by utilizing a system of record-keeping which conceals rather
than discloses relevant records, or makes it unduly difficult to identify or locate
them, thus rendering the production of documents an excessively burdensome
and costly expedition.” Id. at 76.
49
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 602 (7th
Cir. 1997).
50
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *1.
51
Id. at *7.
52
Id. at *3–4 (finding support for the defendant’s position in the Manual for
Complex Litigation § 21.446 (2d ed.1993), which provided that “special
expenses” incident to production of computerized data requested by a party were
“typically” paid by that party). This claim of typicality in the Manual was
dropped in the Fourth Edition, which now provides instead that courts should
“minimize and allocate” such costs, with a preference for the former. MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.446 (4th ed. 2004), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/autoframe?openform&url_l=/public/home.n
sf/inavgeneral?openpage&url_r=/public/home.nsf/pages/470.
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The court considered the issue in terms of “undue burden,” 53
weighing the costs of retrieval against the principle that “if a party chooses
an electronic storage method, the necessity for a retrieval program or
method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk.” 54 Agreeing that the estimated
retrieval costs were high, the court nevertheless noted that the cost resulted
from a system of keeping records over which they had no control. 55 Not
accepting the defendant’s request to shift a problem that it had caused to the
other party, the court instead sought to lessen the problem by ordering the
plaintiff to confer with the defendant to reduce the size of the request and to
pay copying costs of the documents it would receive. 56 Therefore, although
In re Brand Name has been cited as a bright-line rule, its policy that
seemingly favors parties seeking discovery might be better understood as a
rebuttable presumption.
¶20

¶21
In re Brand Name and the cases the court cited are not alone in
reflecting “well established law” that a party should pay costs associated
with “unwieldy” record systems it has chosen. 57 Yet it is hard to find recent
discovery opinions based on this law, likely because most courts have
adopted a broader, formula-based approach that incorporates a variety of
factors, which Section C discusses, 58 including economic considerations,
which Section B discusses.

B. Economics-Based Approach
McPeek v. Ashcroft 59 articulated an economics-based approach to
determine cost-shifting in e-discovery. A federal employee claimed
¶22

53

In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *5;
see also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (providing for protective orders from undue
burden in discovery).
54
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *5.
55
Id. at *6.
56
Id. at *7–8.
57
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., Civ. A. No. 88-9752,
1991 WL 111040, at *8–9 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 1991) (mem.); see also Kaufman
v. Kinko’s Inc., No. Civ.A. 18894-NC, 2002 WL 32123851, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr.
16, 2002) (“Upon installing a data storage system, it must be assumed that at
some point in the future one may need to retrieve the information previously
stored.”); Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., No. 97-2307, 1999 WL 462015 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 16, 1999) (mem.) (stating that, by using backup technology, the
defendant assumed the risk that it would have to produce the information).
58
See infra Part III.C; see also Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 239 F.R.D. 630,
634 (D. Kan. 2006) (mem.) (“The Court is not aware of any decision since
[Zubulake I] that unequivocally prohibits cost-shifting where the Defendant
voluntarily utilized storage technology that is difficult to access or restore.”).
59
McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 32 (D.D.C. 2001) (mem.).

2009

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 2

retaliation based on his prior claim of sexual harassment. 60 The plaintiff
wanted the defendant to search backup tapes for evidence of retaliatory
motives in deleted e-mails. 61 The court considered the defendant’s
objection that this process was too costly under the “undue burden or
expense” standard of Rule 26(c). 62
¶23
The court began by rejecting the bright-line rule of In re Brand
Name, stating that In re Brand Name’s order for the custodian to pay for
backup restoration relied on the mistaken assumption that using electronic
storage requires adequate retrieval capability. 63 The McPeek court also
rejected In re Brand Name’s assumption that businesses could find an
alternative to using backup tape, stating that no alternative exists in
contemporary business. 64 This rejection has two problems. First, the
custodian likely chose the e-mail system for use in everyday communication
rather than for its backup capabilities. The e-mail system, therefore, may
not have adequate backup or retrieval capabilities. 65 Second, alternatives to
inaccessible backup tape exist, as do optional technologies that enable costeffective retrieval from backup tape. 66

The McPeek court instead applied a “marginal utility” test that
assumed that “[t]he more likely it is that the backup tape contains
information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the fairer it is that the
[custodian] search at its own expense.” 67 Suggesting that Rule 26(c)

¶24

60

Id. at 31–32.
Id. at 31–33.
62
Id. at 34.
63
In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, MDL
997, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281, at *5 (mem.).
64
McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 33 (“What alternative is there? Quill pens?”).
65
Compare In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8281,
at *5 (“[I]f a party chooses an electronic storage system, the necessity for a
retrieval program or method is an ordinary and foreseeable risk.”), with id. at *6
(“[Defendant] essentially admits that part of the burden attendant to searching its
storage files results from ‘the limitations of the software [it] is using.’” (quoting
Affidavit of Paul G. Keegan at 7, In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 1995
LEXIS 8281 (No. 94 C 897, MDL 9897))).
66
See Benjamin D. Silbert, Comment, The 2006 Amendments to the Rules of
Civil Procedure: Accessible and Inaccessible Electronic Information Storage
Devices, Why Parties Should Store Electronic Data in Accessible Formats,
RICH. J.L. & TECH., Spring 2007, art. 14, at 23,
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i3/article14.pdf (“[A]s accessible electronic
information storage devices (ATA disks, large hard drives, online backup
services, etc.) become the norm, it remains to be seen how much cost-shifting
occurs, if any, when a party decides to store discoverable information in an
inaccessible format.”).
67
McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34.
61
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protective orders should weigh cost against the probability of finding
something relevant, the court ordered a “test run” of backup e-mails from
the computer of the plaintiff’s supervisor for a one-year period. 68 The court
directed the parties to return when the test was completed to argue whether
the costs and benefits of this search justified further retrieval. 69 Although
few courts have followed McPeek’s holding alone, the decision remains
significant because courts incorporated its analysis into the dominant
formula-based approach Section C discusses. 70

C. Formula-Based Determinations
Bills v. Kennecott Corp 71 is a useful, early example of a courtassembled list of multiple factors courts can weigh when deciding ESI cost
allocation. The opinion noted four factors persuasive in denying costshifting: (1) the overall cost would not be large, (2) the cost would be
greater for the plaintiff than for the defendant, (3) the cost would be a
substantial burden to the plaintiffs, and (4) the party making the discovery
request would derive some benefit from the data to be produced. 72 Two
additional persuasive factors considered in Bills but sometimes omitted
from summaries of its holding 73 are: (1) “information stored in computers
should be as freely discoverable as information not stored in computers, so
parties requesting discovery should not be prejudiced thereby; and (2) the
party responding is usually in the best and most economical position to call
up its own computer stored data.” 74 The latter two factors suggest a
presumption against parties seeking cost-shifting.
¶25

This presumption against cost-shifting changed in Rowe
Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 75 in which the court
arrived at a somewhat different list:
¶26

(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of
discovering critical information; (3) the availability of such
information from other sources; (4) the purposes for which the
responding party maintains the requested data; (5) the relative benefit
68

Id.
Id.
70
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake I), 216 F.R.D. 280, 284
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that the first two Zubulake I factors comprise the
marginal utility test McPeek described).
71
Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 459 (D. Utah 1985) (mem.).
72
Id. at 464.
73
See, e.g., Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 360 (listing only the four
factors).
74
Bills, 108 F.R.D. at 463–64.
75
Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (mem.).
69
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to the parties of obtaining the information; (6) the total cost associated
with production; (7) the relative ability of each party to control costs
and its incentive to do so; and (8) the resources available to each
party. 76
The Rowe factors reversed the earlier presumption against cost-shifting. 77
¶27
One reason for this reversal was the effect of Rowe’s sixth factor,
the cost of production, which “is almost always an objectively large number
in cases where litigating cost-shifting is worthwhile.” 78 Therefore, the court
in Zubulake I slightly revised the Rowe formula to include the following
factors:

(1) [t]he extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover
relevant information; (2) [t]he availability of such information from
other sources; (3) [t]he total cost of production, compared to the
amount in controversy; (4) [t]he total cost of production, compared to
the resources available to each party, (5) [t]he relative ability of each
party to control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) [t]he importance of
the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) [t]he relative benefits to the
parties of obtaining the information. 79
The Zubulake I formula compensates for the Rowe pro-shifting bias by
evaluating production costs, not in absolute terms, but rather in relation to the
resources of the parties. Yet Zubulake I did not adequately acknowledge the
overriding tradition of free discovery that has historically justified reluctance to
extend cost-shifting, which In re Brand Name and Bills articulated. 80 In fact,
the Zubulake I court eliminated the one Rowe factor that might acknowledge
these principles, the fourth factor, which considers the purpose for which a
responding party retained the information. 81 The fact that the responding party
managed data storage in the course of its business seems highly relevant to a
decision to leave related costs of retrieval with the responding party, because
the cost of retrieval will likely be offset by the benefits derived from using the
system in its daily business.

Numerous cases have applied the Rowe or Zubulake I formulas,
sometimes slightly changing the groupings of various factors, with varying

¶28

76

Id. at 429.
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, L.L.C. (Zubulake I), 217 F.R.D. 309, 320
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[O]f the handful of reported opinions that apply Rowe or
some modification thereof, all of them have ordered the cost of discovery to be
shifted to the requesting party.”).
78
Id. at 321.
79
Id. at 322.
80
See supra notes 57, 74 and accompanying text.
81
Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321–22.
77
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results. 82 These cases incorporate the economics-based insights of McPeek
into a complex analysis that dilutes the principles of free discovery
underlying earlier decisions that discouraged cost-shifting, such as In re
Brand Name. These factor-based tests, however, overlook a crucial fact: the
custodian chose the particular data-storage and search-and-retrieval
methods because they offered business benefits despite inefficiencies in
litigation, and thus custodians with these inefficient retrieval mechanisms
voluntarily accepted the related litigation costs.

IV. PROPOSALS TO REFORM COST-SHIFTING
¶29
This Part advances three proposals that modify the formula-based
approach in a way that both honors traditional, liberal discovery principles
and limits the abuses associated with free discovery. To achieve this
balance, courts should (1) eliminate the marginal utility test, (2) shift
benefits as well as costs, and (3) discontinue media-based restrictions.

A. Eliminate the Marginal Utility Test
The marginal utility test suffers from several weaknesses. First, the
test requires courts to predict how beneficial discovery will be before the
discovery actually takes place. 83 A test run to estimate utility as suggested
in McPeek is an inexact substitute for full knowledge. 84
¶30

¶31
Second, the numerical test is biased toward quantity rather than
quality. Marginal utility cannot measure the possibility of finding one key
“smoking gun,” which is fairly common in e-mail discovery. 85 McPeek
ignores the value of computerized discovery in this respect, dismissing the
possibility of finding a needle in a haystack, 86 which is precisely the sort of
task computers can perform economically. 87
¶32
Third, the marginal utility test focuses on utility only at the micro
level rather than the macro level. The actual economic benefits of an
expensive backup procedure can best be measured from the perspective of
the complete computerized business operation into which the procedure is

82

See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 573 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (mem.) (applying a slightly modified version of the Zubulake I factors).
83
See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 323 (“[S]uch proof will rarely exist in advance
of obtaining the requested discovery.”).
84
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
85
See, e.g., Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 312 n.8 (describing an employee who,
after alleging retaliatory firing, found an e-mail suggesting she be fired to avoid
paying a bonus after she filed an EEOC complaint).
86
McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (mem.).
87
See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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integrated, an effect that courts can consider in the context of benefitshifting, which Section B discusses.

B. Consider Broader Benefit-Shifting
¶33
The Zubulake I court characterized the seventh factor—the relative
benefits to the parties—as the “least important” factor. 88 Yet this factor lets
courts consider not only how much the requestor will benefit from the ESI
(which favors cost shifting), but also how much the responding party
benefits generally from its computerized storage system (which disfavors
cost-shifting). The business’s general benefits from a computerized storage
system transcend the high-cost, low-benefit function of backup storage and
retrieval 89 and encompass the overall productivity benefits gained by
managing data electronically. 90 Such a calculation would likely show that
occasional retrieval costs of ESI previously transferred to backup tape are a
small and necessary part of foreseeable computer-related expenditures. 91
Retrieval of ESI in discovery is a cost of doing business and should come as
no surprise to large or small businesses. 92 Businesses budget, or should
budget, for such expenditures as part of a general commitment to have a
complete and productive computer operation.

Even if benefit shifting is restricted to account only for data-storage
operations, the seventh factor should recognize savings realized by a
responding party that uses an inexpensive backup system rather than more
expensive, and more accessible, media. 93 The responding party made a
business decision when it opted for an inexpensive backup system over a
more expensive but more accessible system with lower retrieval costs.
Thus, courts should balance the high retrieval costs associated with an
¶34

88

Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 322. For a list of the Zubulake I factors, see text
accompanying note 79.
89
See supra Part I.
90
See supra Part I.
91
See supra note 19.
92
See Jennifer Schiff, Rules About to Change in E-Discovery Game,
ENTERPRISESTORAGEFORUM.COM, Nov. 7, 2006,
http://www.enterprisestorageforum.com/continuity/features/article.php/3642421
(stating that a 2005 law firm study showed that companies with at least $1
billion in annual revenue were involved in an average of 147 lawsuits at any one
time, while the corresponding number for companies with revenues under $1
billion was thirty-seven).
93
See Stephen J. Bigelow, Tape Backup Overview, SEARCHSTORAGE.CO.UK,
Aug. 7, 2007,
http://searchstorage.techtarget.co.uk/news/article/0,289142,sid181_gci1292227,
00.html (“Although tape performance is relatively slow, tape fits well into the
storage architecture, because it allows users to store a large volume of data at a
reasonable price.”).
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inexpensive but less accessible backup system against the savings gained by
the responding party when it initially purchases that system. Unless
responding parties who initially purchase inexpensive systems are forced to
internalize the costs of using those systems, there is no incentive for a
company to use anything but the least expensive, least technologically
efficient, and least accessible system.
¶35
In assessing benefits under the seventh factor, one may consider the
drafters’ concern that creating this category of ESI would lead corporations
to “make[] information ‘inaccessible’ because it is likely to be discoverable
in litigation.” 94 Although the drafters felt that existing provisions for
sanctions would take care of this concern, 95 some abusive actions do not
justify sanctions. Thus, the Supreme Court observed that nonsanctionable
actions to keep documents out of the hands of others “are common in
business.” 96
¶36
These actions are often legal and may even be prudent business
strategies. In any case, it would be difficult to prove a business’s motive for
choosing a particular ESI storage medium. 97 Rather than demand that a
requesting party prove a suspected motive, 98 it may be more efficient
simply to interpret Zubulake I’s seventh factor as weighing against costshifting whenever a business has a more accessible alternative to using a

94

COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., supra note 3, at 32.
95

Id.
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005).
97
But see Posting of Paladin to ExDHL,
http://exdhl.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=757 (Sept. 10, 2005, 12:29 PM)
(“[Despite better alternatives,] some companies continue using backup tapes
because they fear that online archiving will create more discoverable data,
according to [one software consultant].”).
98
See Robert Allan Eisenberg, Proactive on Backups, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 2005,
http://www.doar.com/apps/uploads/literature22_NYLJ_Back-up_Tapes.pdf
(suggesting that prospective responding parties should discontinue using backup
tapes for purposes other than backup to avoid courts classifying the tape as
accessible). Courts conducting cost-shifting inquiries must diligently watch for
possible gaming. See CRAIG BALL, WHAT JUDGES SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
DISCOVERY FROM BACKUP TAPES 4 (2007), available at
http://www.craigball.com/What_Judges_Should_Know_About_Discovery_from
_Backup_Tapes-corrected.pdf (urging courts to inquire, (1) Does the responding
party sometimes restore backup tapes to ensure proper system function or to
retrieve mistakenly deleted files? (2) Have these backup tapes been restored in
other circumstances? (3) Does the responding party have the in-house capacity
to restore the data? (4) Are search and extraction technologies available that do
not require wholesale tape restoration? (5) Are cheaper outside restoration
services available?).
96
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less accessible medium 99 because the business derived the overall
productivity benefits associated with managing data electronically. 100

C. Courts Should Not Use Cost Allocation to Control Abusive
Discovery
Abusive discovery is a long-standing problem, and courts did not
condone it even when applying traditional doctrines of liberal discovery.101
Considerable efforts to address the abuses have been made over the past
twenty years, with approaches that apply uniformly to all media forms. 102
Although commentators have argued that ESI is particularly susceptible to
abuse, 103 drafters of the 2006 amendments concluded that changing the
rules only for a particular data-storage medium is not the best way to
control discovery abuses that exist for all media. 104 In fact, the capacity of
computers to quickly search large quantities of ESI has the potential to
reduce the burdens of discovery. 105 Judge Scheindlin gives an instructive
example: e-mail messages revealed a party’s plan to force a favorable
settlement by running up discovery costs, which was critical in a jury’s
deliberations. 106
¶37

¶38
If abusive discovery is a problem, it should be corrected through
measures directed at all abusive practices, not merely those involving ediscovery. Discovery that is intended to coerce settlement, or that is unduly
burdensome or expensive under the proportionality rule applicable across
media forms, 107 should be prohibited altogether, rather than subjected to

99

For a list of alternative backup systems, see supra note 66.
See Jake Frazier, Are Market Forces and Technological Advances Already
Making the “Reasonably Accessible” Category Obsolete?, DIGITAL DISCOVERY
& E-EVIDENCE, May 2005,
http://www.renewdata.com/pdf/Pike_&_Fischer_article_reprint_May_05.pdf
(“If the rules accord information on ‘backup tapes’ an extra layer of protection
from discovery, for example, then perhaps corporations might be encouraged to
use antiquated techniques for a strategic advantage.”).
101
See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (warning against
examinations “conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass or oppress”).
102
See supra Part II.A.
103
See supra note 9.
104
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE U.S., supra note 3, at 21–38.
105
See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 12, at 344 (giving the example of what
would be one thousand hours of billable document review time completed in
minutes).
106
Id. at 339 n.42.
107
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
100
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cost-shifting. The court in Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc. 108
pointed to a basic flaw of simply using cost-shifting in such a case: “There
is something inconsistent with our notions of fairness to allow one party to
obtain a heightened level of discovery because it is willing to pay for it.” 109

CONCLUSION
¶39
Effective management of ESI has let businesses store and
communicate information much more efficiently. ESI has also affected the
discovery process, however, raising concerns about the accessibility of data
and the cost of retrieval. From the 1980s on, various amendments have
incorporated ESI into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Courts have
also developed strategies to review discovery of ESI, such as economic- or
formula-based approaches to balance the need for discovery of all relevant
facts against the burden of retrieval. Courts have been mindful of abusive
discovery techniques that seek to raise the cost of retrieval as well as shift
the costs, potentially affecting the outcomes of a particular case. As the
Rules and the courts have tried to incorporate ESI into the existing
framework, new technological advances such as better retrieval mechanisms
have changed the methods of storage and retrieval, requiring courts to add
additional factors to review and balance e-discovery burdens.
¶40
Previous concepts of “undue burden” and “not reasonably
accessible” ESI may soon be outdated due to these advances, and courts
will need to adjust previous approaches. This iBrief’s recommendations
provide a framework for future review. First, eliminating the marginal
utility test would preserve the full body of ESI for discovery purposes and
allow the plaintiff to search for a “smoking gun” e-mail. Second, benefit
shifting allows the consideration of a broader range of items than costshifting when evaluating the full cost of ESI. Lastly, a uniform approach to
curb abuses of all discovery would be more efficient and meaningful than
focusing only on ESI. As a whole, these recommendations would allow the
courts to keep pace with ESI advancements while balancing discovery
needs with proper limitations on abusive discovery practices.
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Cognex Corp. v. Electro Scientific Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A. 01CV10287RCL,
2002 WL 32309413 (D. Mass. July 2, 2002) (mem.) (rejecting a party’s request
to examine voluminous backup tapes despite its offer to pay production costs).
109
Id. at *6.

